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Abstract: Since the withdrawal of U.K from the east of Suez and the Persian Gulf 
region, the security system of this area has been confronted with many challenges and 
the concern about security has been reintroduced in to the debate on the world order and 
it has enhanced the previous efforts of the united states of America to establish a balance 
of power security system among Soviet Union. Furthermore, the end of formal 
domination of United Kingdom since 1971 brought to the debate the issue of security 
studies and related questions in the Persian Gulf region. Occurrence of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran in 1979 was a period that the U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf 
confronted with serious challenges and so the U.S. leaders began to make some 
important policies for this region; because this area had an important role for America's 
economy and industries. But these policies have always been facing serious challenges 
from Iran and other countries in the region. This article is to study perspective of the U.S. 
government on security systems of the United States in the Persian Gulf region and 
internal security approaches according on specific characteristics of this region taken by 
the littoral stats based on indigenous values and practices.  
Key words:  Regional security; Persian Gulf; United States; Dual containment; Twin 
pillar policy; Carter Doctrine 
 
Resumé: Depuis le retrait du Royaume-Uni dans l'est de Suez et dans le golfe persique, 
le système de sécurité de cette région a été confrontée à de nombreux défis et la 
préoccupation concernant la sécurité a été réintroduite dans le débat sur l'ordre mondial. 
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Il a renforcé les efforts précédents des États-Unis de créer un équilibre du système de 
sécurité de pouvoir au sein de l'Union soviétique. En outre, la fin de la domination 
formelle du Royaume-Uni depuis 1971 a apporté au débat la question des études de 
sécurité et des questions apparentées dans la région du golfe persique. Le surgissement 
de la révolution islamique en Iran en 1979 était une période dans laquelle les intérêts 
américains dans le golfe persique sont confrontés à des défis sérieux et donc les 
dirigeants américains ont commencé à faire des politiques importantes pour cette région, 
parce que cette région a un rôle important pour l'économie et industries américaines. 
Mais ces politiques ont toujours été confrontés à des défis sérieux de l'Iran et des autres 
pays dans la région. Cet article tente d'étudier la perspective du gouvernement américain 
sur les systèmes de sécurité des États-Unis dans la région du golfe persique et les 
approches de la sécurité intérieure en fonction des caractéristiques spécifiques de cette 
région des états littoraux basées sur des valeurs et des pratiques autochtones. 
Mots-clés: sécurité régionale; Golfe Persique; Etats-Unis; double confinement ; 
politique de deux piliers; Doctrine Carter 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is going to examine the role of Iran before and after Islamic revolution in the security 
arrangements of the Persian Gulf. With Britain’s withdrawal from Persian Gulf area in 1971, the U.S 
actively sought to establish a new security system to fill the power vacuum in the region. This policy has 
remained based on the firm belief that Western (indeed global) prosperity is tied to the security of oil 
supplies from the Persian Gulf. Nixon’s Doctrine, Carter’s Doctrine, and Clinton’s Doctrine, are some of 
the security systems that were formulated for this region mainly to protect oil resources from any 
aggressive actions; but evidences and historical facts show neither of these security arrangements 
considered Iran’s demands as a main part of this agreements.  
This paper states the background of Iran’s history in the Persian Gulf and the Importance and Attributes 
of Persian Gulf Geopolitics; a review on security policies that were held in the Persian Gulf since 1971 to 
2008 with a short explanation on each security doctrine for this region; the foreign policy of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran toward Persian Gulf area , emphasizing the policies of littoral states of the Persian Gulf – 
GCC- vis-à-vis Iran; reasons of change or continuity of contemporary security systems in the Persian Gulf. 
The last part will discuss about the alternative security systems for this region.  
 
2.  BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF THE PERSIAN 
GULF  
 
The Persian Gulf is a shallow semi-enclosed sea between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. It is bordered by 
Oman and the United Arab Emirates on the south, Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia on the west, Kuwait and 
Iraq on the north and Iran along the entire east coast. The Persian Gulf has the largest hydrocarbon reserves 
in the world, which makes this area extremely important for oil production and one of the most important 
strategic waterways in the world.  
The Persian Gulf states have a population of over 129.8 million people, of which 68 million are Iranian. 
Islam is the dominant religion and plays an important role in governance, as does the split between the 
Sunni and Shiite sects. Before the fall of Saddam, Iran stood as the only Shiite ruled nation but current 
indications suggest the Shia will hold a majority position in the new Iraqi government (Wallace, 2005). 
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The main geopolitical indices and feature of the region is highest volume of fossil fuel exports to the 
world. Proven crude oil reserves of the Persian Gulf littoral states of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, 
the UAE, and Oman stand at around 66 percent of world’s total oil reserves. Saudi Arabia has nearly 25 
percent of the world’s crude oil reserves and then followed by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and the UAE. Therefore, 
the five Persian Gulf littoral states (Iran, the UAE, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) hold the world’s main 
proven oil reserves. The Persian Gulf littoral states (Iran, the UAE, Bahrain, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
Kuwait, Qatar and Yemen) also score high in terms of crude oil production. In 2002, they produced 27 
percent of the world’s total production. The region’s natural gas reserves stand at around 45 percent of 
world’s total gas reserves. Almost 80 percent of all proven natural gas reserves of the Middle East are 
located in the Persian Gulf. The area produces around 32 percent of world’s total crude production (Eia, 
2006). 
Persian Gulf is also an effective geo-strategic center in international system. Its role in generating 
religious and political thoughts; Iran’s geographical position between Russia and the newly-established 
republics and their link to the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean; Saudi Arabia’s access to 
the strategic waterways of the Sea of Oman, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean; stretching to 
the Suez Canal and the European continent through the Strait of Bab-ol-Mandab (Saeed Taeb & KHalili, 
2008). 
 
3.   U.S. SECURITY POLICIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF SINCE 
1971 TO 2008 
 
The security of Persian Gulf, especially since the discovery of oil resources in this region, has always been 
a pressing issue among the regional states, the international community and the industrial world. Over the 
past two decades, the regional states have had inconsequential role in the region’s much needed security. 
England saw itself as responsible for ensuring the region’s security, its vast oil reserves and the flow of free 
trade until the World War II (Saeed Taeb & KHalili, 2008). 
 
3.1  Twin pillar policy 
With Britain’s disengagement east of Suez (and also Persian Gulf area) in 1971, the U.S actively sought to 
establish a new security system to fill the power vacuum in the region. This policy has remained based on 
the firm belief that Western (indeed global) prosperity is tied to the security of oil supplies from the Persian 
Gulf. Given the hard lessons learned in Vietnam, Washington did not want to send its troops to the Persian 
Gulf. Instead, the Nixon Administration formulated the ‘twin-pillar’ policy: reliance on two regional 
powers (Iran and Saudi Arabia) to protect oil resources from any hostile threat. Of the two, Iran was 
regarded as being militarily more capable of securing western interests and politically more stable than 
Saudi Arabia. The Iran’s Shah was thus given almost unlimited access to the most sophisticated US 
weaponry and gradually came to be regarded as the “policeman of the Persian Gulf”(Hurewitz, 1972, p. 
33).  
The twin-pillar policy as part of US strategy after the defeat in Vietnam and under the condition of 
bipolarity was largely complementary with the self-perception of Iran and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, 
legitimating and reinforcing their roles as status quo powers in the region(Adib-Moghaddam, 2006a). 
The twin pillar policy ended badly for the United States in Iran. A strategy based on structures of power 
without regard to internal governance proved to be only as stable as its least stable pillar. Learning that 
stability demands legitimacy is crucial for building a new Gulf security order. Similarly, U.S. dependence 
on local powers to spare it the costs and risks of a major presence of its own can be self-deluding if the local 
powers are prone to fail or change(Rathmell, Karasik, & Gompert, 2003a). The initial US managed system 
collapsed when a popular uprising spearheaded by radical clerics swept away the Shah. In sum two 
important developments led to the collapse of this twin-pillar policy at the end of 1979s. First, the Pahlavi 
regime in Iran was overthrown and replaced by the Islamic Republic and the leadership of the Ayatollah 
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Khomeini. Second, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and became in a position to pose a direct threat to oil 
supplies from the Persian Gulf. These two developments caused hard changes in the U.S policy in the 
region, promulgated in the ‘Carter doctrine’. 
 
3.2  Carter doctrine  
In an effort to position the United States as the dominant external player in the Persian Gulf region, Carter 
declared in his State of the Union Address on 23 January 1980: ‘An attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of 
America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.’(Potter & 
Sick, 2002). 
Thus, Washington shifted from relying on regional powers to a readiness to use its own military force to 
defend oil resources. In line with this new strategy Carter authorized the creation of the Rapid Deployment 
Joint Task Force. (Later renamed the U.S. Central Command [USCENTCOM]). At this point, the Carter 
Doctrine came into being.  
According to Carter Doctrine the United States would no longer rely on potentially unstable allies but 
intervene directly through the Rapid Deployment Force, later incorporated into the Central Command. An 
agreement was reached with the Saudi government whereby, in exchange for the sale of an integrated 
package of highly sophisticated weaponry, the Saudis would build and pay for an elaborate system of 
command, naval and air facilities large enough to “sustain US forces in intensive regional combat”. 
According to the Carter Doctrine (1980), any effort by a hostile power to block the flow of oil from the 
Persian Gulf to the U.S. will be viewed as an attack on America’s vital interests and will be repelled by any 
means necessary including military force. Since then, the U.S. has exercised the Carter doctrine several 
times. (such as Iran-Iraq war) 
 
3.3   Dual Containment   
The end of bipolarity and the systemically legitimated penetration of the region by US forces were seen as 
reason enough to take a rather more offensive posture towards regional challengers, a view that was shared 
by strategists in Washington. Hence, the dual containment policy instead of the rather more passive 
balances of power rationale which had dominated US policy towards the region for the last four decades. 
With the modified structure of the international system, the United States felt reassured that marginalizing 
the two principal powers in the region, Iran and Iraq, would secure long-term US interests in the Persian 
Gulf, without the threat of any serious international backlash. As former National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake put it: 
“we no longer have to fear Soviet efforts to gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf by taking advantage of our 
support for one of these states to build relations with the other. The strategic importance of both Iraq and 
Iran has therefore been reduced dramatically, and their ability to play the superpowers off each other has 
been eliminated.”(Adib-Moghaddam, 2006b, p. 94) 
During 1993-1997, the Clinton Administration articulated a policy of “dual containment,” an effort to 
keep Iran and Iraq weak rather than alternately tilting toward one or the other to preserve a power balance 
between them. During this period, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were primarily concerned about the 
conventional threat from Iraq and saw Iran as a counterweight to Iraqi power.(Mraz, 1997)  
Dual containment was a comprehensive policy ordered by President Clinton that Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher hinted at the emerging shift in February 1993 by branding Iran an ‘international 
outlaw’ and a ‘dangerous country’ for ‘the support of terrorism’ and ‘the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.’(Ahmadi, 2008, p. 159) 
The broad outlines of this approach were described in a speech in May 1993 by Martin S. Indyk, the 
Senior Director for Middle East policy at the National Security Council, to the Washington Institute for 
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Near East Policy, a research group. He stated that the new policy stemmed from ‘a clear-headed assessment 
of the antagonism that both regimes harbor toward the US and its allies in the region’(Ahmadi, 2008). The 
Clinton policy of dual containment can be seen as, “the culmination of a trend toward an increasingly direct 
American strategic role in the gulf(Gause, 1994). 
Anthony Lake believed that the containment of these nations would be done in three ways: first, through 
isolation from the international community, second, diplomatic and economic pressures using such 
methods as UN sanctions or international boycotts, and third, restrictions of their military and technical 
capabilities. Lake then looks at the containment of Iraq and Iran and says that the United States desires a 
balance of power in the Persian Gulf with the goal of protecting “the security interests of our friends and in 
the free flow of oil at stable prices.” (Lake, 1994, pp. 47-48). 
Lake concludes that dual containment is a genuine and responsible effort to protect American interests, 
stabilize international politics, and enlarge the community of nations committed to America’s core values. 
The three major risks, acknowledged by Lake and other proponents of dual containment were: driving Iran 
and Iraq together in an alliance, opening Iraq to manipulation, and destabilizing Iraq’s sovereignty. 
Dual containment was drafted to allow America to accomplish its three primary objectives in the region:  
isolation of Iran and Iraq, security of Israel, and access to oil(Mraz, 1997). Many of criticizers of dual 
containment such as F. Gregory Gause, believe that the policy of dual containment is unattainable and The 
United States, by isolating itself from Iran and Iraq, has effectively cut off any influence it may have had 
over these two states. They believe that the United States cannot contain Iran unilaterally, and such a large 
American military presence in the region created instability. Critics of dual containment generally agree 
that Iran was not the threat that the United States perceived it to be. Opponents of dual containment all 
recommend some form of diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic. At a real conclusion we must say 
America’s attempt to control Iran politically, economically, and militarily has been almost without major 
success(Mraz, 1997). 
 
3.4  Direct presence in the region  
When Iraq attacked Kuwait in 1991, the dual containment policy was reached to its ends.  After the second 
Gulf war, the U.S. increased its use of major bases, prepositioned material, and naval forces in the region. 
The strategic goal has been to protect the security of Persian Gulf oil and its availability to the global 
economy. The means to this goal have been (a) to contain or change Persian Gulf governments hostile to the 
U.S., and (b) to support the allied Persian Gulf governments that are friendly to the U.S.(Rathmell, Karasik, 
& Gompert, 2003b) 
Iran before and after Islamic Revolution was most concerned about the deployment of direct U.S. forces 
to the Persian Gulf region. Before Islamic revolution also Iran was opposite the presence of foreign troops 
in the region. After the British withdrawal in the late 1960s, Mohammad Reza Shah insisted that “the 
Americans should realize that our opposition to foreign intervention in the region is serious.”(Milani, 2004) 
After direct deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf region, Iran has protested several times 
especially in recent times that local Iraqi government was established but still U.S. forces are continuing 
occupying Iraq even though president Obama has emphasized during 2009 election that he will withdraw 
American forces from Iraq as soon as possible, but it hasn’t happen until now.  
 
4.  IRAN’S POLICY TOWARD PERSIAN GULF REGION 
 
Iran with a population of over 70 million is among the largest countries in the Middle East. It possesses vast 
lands and extended sea borders in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea region. Iran produces 4.2 million 
barrels of oil per day. Iran’s proven oil reserves stand at around 132.5 billion barrels (over %11 of the 
world’s reserves). In addition, the country has around 27.50 billion cubic meters of natural gas (%15.3 of 
the world’s proven natural gas reserves). (Lotfian, 2007-08) 
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Focusing on Iran’s ambitions toward Persian Gulf shows that lack of security is a main motivation of Iran 
to persuade a new security system for the Persian Gulf. Iran has a deep concern about national security 
within a regional and international context. Security concerns of Iran includes American troops near east 
and west borders (Iraq and Afghanistan), neighbors that are allies of America such as Turkey and 
Azerbaijan, nuclear neighbors that are also allies of America (India and Pakistan), Israel as an enemy that is 
also nuclear and problems with Arab neighbors (borders-Shi'ism). Political prestige is also another 
motivation for Iran to persuade a new security system for the Persian Gulf. Iran has been a great power for 
a long time and now it wants to reacquire her historical position . (Bahjat, 2006)   
Historical and religious heritage and prestige of Iranian in the Middle East has been another motivation 
for Iranians to go toward a stable security system to strengthen them and protect their allies in the Middle 
East. Most of the Iranians are Shi'a that is opposite of sunny in Islam. Iranians are proud of their religious 
heritage and they want to protect their religious identity also they want to protect Shi'a groups in other Arab 
countries like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Jeysholmahdi in Iraq.  (Brennan, 2008) 
Since Iranian revolution in 1979, Iran has shaped her foreign policy in answer to direct threats to her 
security, sovereignty and internal integrity, which had been related to ideological structure of Iran. After 
9/11, the USA entered Afghanistan and Iraq and complicated Iranian position even more. Longstanding 
American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan created many threats to Iran, in the same time it gave new 
opportunities for increasing Iran’s influence in region and her international position. Without Iran’s will, 
probably there won’t be any peace in those states. On the other hand, radicalized policies of the Islamic 
regime may result in international isolation or even in open conflict with the United States. (Bojarczyk, 
2008) 
In an informal announcement of Iran’s decision to ensure a successful regional security system for the 
Persian Gulf; Saideh Lotfian believes Iran, Iraq and Yemen must be part of any security arrangement in the 
Persian Gulf.(Lotfian, 2007-08) she believes the main pillar of Iranian policy on the Persian Gulf is based, 
on the regional states’ responsibility for ensuring security of this region without the outside help. One 
barrier in the way of improving the security environment of the region is the current tension between Iran 
and the United States. This has also overshadowed Iran’s ties with other regional states. In sum Iranian 
think about an effective regional security pact to minimize extra-regional Influence of foreign countries.  
 
5.  CURRENT SECURITY SYSTEMS IN THE PERSIAN GULF: 
CONTINUATION OR CHANGES? 
 
In this article and in previous pages we mentioned that peace and security in the Persian Gulf region has 
been always instable and U.S. policies regarding to this region confronted with many challenges especially 
from Iran and Iraq in recent years until downfall of saddam’s   regime in Iraq by U.S. armies. It is clear that 
the establishment of peace and stability in Iraq is not the only factor for providing security in the sensitive 
region of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf although Iraq in recent years has confronted with many 
difficulties from side of terrorist groups like Taliban in this country. Occurrence of four wars in less than 
three decades in the region is the best reason for adopting new security strategy based on non-presence of 
foreign forces and in cooperation with all regional states. So, in the Persian Gulf, Iran believes that since the 
threat of Saddam in the region has disappeared, all regional countries should take concrete steps to restore 
security in the region collectively. With this logic, the Islamic Republic of Iran has proposed plans for 
security arrangement in the Persian Gulf, based on the cooperation of all of the littoral states.  
At the other side we must consider this fact in international relation that absolute military power does not 
provide solutions to global problems. In other words power in its hardware dimension, even when wielded 
by the most powerful countries, has not helped the realization of their political or economic objectives. 
What we saw in the recent years’ wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon all indicate the lack of efficiency 
of this model of behavior of absolute military powers(Mohammadi, 2007) 
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Based on these principles and virtues, Iran has condemned the unilateral action in Iraq and calls for the 
withdrawal of occupying forces from Iraq and therefore a timetable should be set for withdrawal of foreign 
forces from Iraq. Despite certain beliefs, the withdrawal can help establish more security in Iraq. Iran is of 
the view that security affairs in Iraq should be handed completely to the democratically elected government 
and the Iraqi people should run the security affairs of their country themselves. Iran believes the Iraqi forces 
and government have potentials to establish security and stability in the country through efforts by all 
political and tribal groups. 
Based on the abovementioned factors and elements, the principles of Iran’s Persian Gulf policy are 
multilateralism, regional capacity building and confidence building. These principles mirror Iran’s policies 
of détente, peaceful coexistence, decontainment and active engagement. (Mohammadi, 2007) 
 
6. TOWARD A NEW PERSIAN GULF SECURITY SYSTEM 
 
So many scholars that are not agreeing with today’s security system of the Persian Gulf had suggested new 
systems for this region. In this paper I will mention some of them in brief and in conclusion will be 
mentioned the best option that can be more applicable to both the regional countries of the Persian Gulf 
region and outside powers, especially for Iran that is the most important country in this area and in the 
Middle East and always after Islamic revolution in 1979 has been in center of conflicts in this region.  
Cliff Kupchan a member of Eurasia Group believes that The Persian Gulf nations should build a system 
based on indigenous values and practices and the Asian experience may be more useful than what Scholars 
have often looked to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), because at First, 
Asian nations, like those of the Persian Gulf, are generally not western-style democracies, and the 
"substructure" of Asian international relations is more like that of the Persian Gulf than is Europe's. Second, 
the current Asian security system is relatively similar to the Persian Gulf system: both feature a central role 
for regional great powers and for bilateral relations with the U.S., which play reassurance and balancing 
roles. Third, the nature and structure of Asian cooperative security systems, in their informality and respect 
for nation-state sovereignty, offer instructive lessons for building a future Persian Gulf wide cooperative 
security system.(Kupchan, 2007) 
Kupchan (2007) believes that mechanisms used by OSCE may be useful, but the nature of European 
security relations and the structure and some missions of OSCE as a cooperative security organization are 
not a good fit for the Persian Gulf. He believes that a Persian Gulf forum would open and regularize three 
much needed avenues of communication: between the northern countries (Iran, Iraq) and the GCC; between 
the "big 3" (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia); and between the smaller GCC nations and the northern states. As in 
Asia, a cooperative security forum would exist on top of the bedrock security structure, comprised of the 
realities of U.S. balancing and regional great power policies. 
Kupchan (2007) suggests the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum for the Persian 
Gulf region and expresses that the ASEAN experience offers many useful guidelines for a new Persian Gulf 
forum. The principle of "non-interference" in domestic affairs would appeal to and reassure Persian Gulf 
states as they contemplate a new forum. As with Asia, many states are concerned with regime stability, do 
not welcome outside involvement, and do not want domestic governance to be criteria for membership or 
topic for discussion. The principle of "regional solutions to regional problems" would also attract Persian 
Gulf littoral states. A regional forum would permit them to take a larger role in enhancing their own security, 
an argument Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations have been making. 
The challenge to the Kupchan belief is that as ASEAN forum he suggests that presence of one foreign 
superpower (America) is necessary in this forum in the Persian Gulf forum, but experience of the Persian 
Gulf region indicates that the presence of U.S. in this region always has been confronted with challenges 
after Islamic revolution in Iran, therefore this forum also can not be a good basis for peace and security in 
this region. 
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Michael Kraig is another famous scholar in Persian Gulf filed that believes comprehensive multilateral 
coalition’s strategy offers the best prospect for building a peaceful and stable future in the Persian Gulf, if 
leaders are concerned with long-term value rather than short-term gains. Kraig concludes that there are two 
major contending approaches to Persian Gulf security: U.S. hegemony and principled multilateralism. If the 
hegemony approach is going to carried out Persian Gulf relations would be patterned to a big conflicts. But 
In contrast to the approach of hegemony, a principled multilateral approach to Persian Gulf security would 
have the success for this region.(M. Kraig, 2004) 
Michael Kraig believes that a new security order should be created in the Persian Gulf by building 
additional layers to the current security system with a greater emphasis on multilateral cooperation. 
U.S.-Persian Gulf-state bilateral cooperation and the GCC would serve as the base layer. The second layer 
would involve setting up a new security organization that could notionally be called the “[Persian] Gulf 
Regional Security Forum (GRSF).” Southern and northern Persian Gulf States, without exceptions, would 
be the core members, together with extra-regional states and organizations with vested interests in the 
Persian Gulf. (M. R. Kraig, 2006) 
The critique to the Kraig’s approach is that Kraig believes Involving extra-regional states - most notably 
the United States - in a peaceful and stable Persian Gulf will be important for achieving long-term stability 
(M. R. Kraig, 2006) but the experiences of recent years in the Persian gulf has shown that his idea cannot be 
true, because in spite of presence of external powers especially Americans, many disturbs and conflicts has 
been accrued in this important region.   
Joseph McMillan, Richard Sokolsky, and Andrew C. Winner, three scholars in Persian Gulf problems, in 
another point of view believe that the Persian Gulf region lacks a systematic way for Iran, Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia to interact with the rest of the Persian Gulf states. Then there must establish a new multilateral 
element to the region’s security architecture.(Winner, 2003) But they believe this new arrangement could 
entail certain risks for the United States. The principal limitation from a U.S. perspective is that a regional 
security structure could never substitute for the ability of the United States to project military power to the 
region to protect its own interests in extremis. The principal risk is that any security institution that 
embraces all the Persian Gulf countries could become an anti-U.S. or anti-Israeli bloc. 
McMillan, Sokolsky& Winner believe any security architecture for Persian Gulf must be able to 
accomplish three objectives: 1) provide a collective self-defense capability for the weaker states; 2) 
promote an environment of cooperation on security issues that will reduce the probability and consequences 
of conflict among all the Persian Gulf states and enable them to cooperate on transnational threats; 3) enable 
the region to play an effective and constructive role in strengthening peace and stability beyond the Persian 
Gulf.(Winner, 2003) 
The writers believe a more inclusive multilateral security dialogue may be able to: 1) Increase the ability 
of regional states to deal with limited threats to peace and stability without requiring the major involvement 
of outside powers; 2) provide a mechanism for peaceful resolution of specific areas of contention that could 
otherwise cause the rivalries to flare up into open conflict; 3) identify a modest body of shared interests, 
toward which regional states can agree to work; 4) erode exclusionary barriers that inflame suspicions and 
drive states toward planning for worst-case scenarios; 5) develop habits of intraregional cooperation, upon 
which more ambitious efforts to increase regional stability can subsequently be built.(Winner, 2003) 
They conclude, what the Persian Gulf needs, is a series of overlapping bilateral and multilateral 
relationships, with the newest element being a mutually reinforcing network of linkages among all the 
Persian Gulf states, including Iran and Iraq. So they believe that the ASEAN [the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations] Regional Forum (ARF), could serve as a model for a vehicle for dialogue on regional 
security issues in the Persian Gulf.(Winner, 2003) 
But in a real vision and open-minded opinion, Persian Gulf has its characteristics and need a security 
arrangement based on its history and states and ASEAN and other arrangements forums cannot be useful 
and helpful for this region, anyway, other security arrangements can be as a sample for this region not as a 
prescription. In other side, McMillan, Sokolsky and Winner believe a new regional security architecture is 
only one element of a broader security arrangement for the Persian Gulf region and this order will continue 
to require a significantly revamped U.S. military presence, bilateral security arrangements between 
Seyed Mohsen Mirhosseini; Sarvinder Kaur Sandhu/Cross-cultural Communication 
Vol.6 No.4, 2010 
   129
Washington and some Persian Gulf states, a robust U.S. capability to project power, and Persian Gulf state 
initiatives to promote good governance. 
Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik, and David Gompert another three Persian Gulf problems scholars, 
outline the disadvantages to the United States and to the region of today’s heavy dependence on a forward 
U.S. military presence and readiness to fight increasingly risky expeditionary wars. They believe that two 
alternative models for the Persian Gulf, a unilateral U.S. attempt to impose liberal democracy or a return to 
balance of power approach, will not work. Instead, a multilateral U.S. - European effort to build an 
intra-regional balance of power, by broad political reform around the Persian Gulf, could lay the basis for 
long-term stability.(Andrew Rathmell, 2003) 
Rathmell, Karasik & Gompert explain the past attempts of United State for building a Persian Gulf 
security after withdrawal of Grate Britain in 1971s and believe the Nixon’s Doctrine of Twin Pillars policy’ 
that the United States used the twin pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia to ensure stability and to contain threats 
to the status quo’ the U.S. strategy of relying on Iraq and the Persian Gulf states after Islamic revolution in 
Iran’ and Dual Containment Policy for containing Iran and Iraq, were not successful and the United States 
shifted from reliance on regional friends to an even more muscular forward presence. (Andrew Rathmell, 
2003) 
These scholars suggest two options for a postwar Persian Gulf security system that could form the basis 
for a redesign of the region: 1) Radical political transformation (leaping head to the 1920s): the 
democratizing vision will enable countries across the region to defuse domestic dissent and become 
productive members of the international community. But undemocratic Arab rulers are naturally frightened 
by this vision of democracy. 2) Second choice is leaping back to 1970s toward to twin-pillars approach that 
is a more pragmatic model for a post-war Persian Gulf security system, this time relying on the GCC and 
Iraq. This model is unlikely to succeed because the past three decades have not resolved some of the 
underlying issues of Persian Gulf insecurity and because recent changes have made life more challenging. 
(Andrew Rathmell, 2003) 
Finally these scholars at the end of their analysis conclude that no single paradigm will be sufficient to 
build a Gulf security system. (Andrew Rathmell, 2003) Instead, a Persian Gulf security system needs to be 
constructed from three interlocking elements: balance of power, reform of the region’s and defense 
structures, and multilateralism that United States and the EU need to partner in this process. Only such a 
combination will provide both the progress and the stability needed for enduring security. 
Mraz in a different perspective, express three broad policy options for shaping a policy for the Persian 
Gulf: First, continuing the policy of Dual Containment, engaging Iran or Iraq, or both, seeking or 
supporting a change in the regimes of Iran and Iraq. (Mraz, 1997) Mraz explains the advantages and 
disadvantages of these policies and at the end he believes that the United States should pursue a more active 
policy of engagement and enlargement. “The first method of engagement should be commercial. America 
must find some common ground with Iran. A US policy, which recognizes that Iran and Iraq are less of a 
threat if they are engaged, will be the greatest contributor in achieving our strategic interest in the 
region”.(Mraz, 1997) 
Saeed Taeb & Hossein KHalili two Iranian scholars present three Strategic Scenarios for security 
building in Persian Gulf region: A) Formation of a security arrangement in the region encompassing the 
eight littoral states anchored in a joint security solution against the US policies. They believe such an 
assumption if enacted, could be the most desirable and ideal model for the regional states, especially Iran. 
However, in the existing regional and international circumstances, chance for such a convergence is 
slim.(Saeed Taeb & KHalili, 2008) 
 B) Second Strategic Scenario Assumption: The security structures of Persian Gulf littoral states devised 
by the US. They believe this scenario dates back to a 1970s strategy and follows the Nixon doctrine which 
is based on the policy of “balance of power” and reducing US military presence in the region. A plan as 
such could in the short-run hoard the region from the present crisis; help the US have a face-saving retreat 
from Iraq; and limit US presence to fewer bases but they believe even a plan as such has its own 
challenges.(Saeed Taeb & KHalili, 2008) 
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C) Third Strategic Scenario Assumption: Forming a “security partnership arrangement” on the basis of 
traditional values and practices that is compatible with the people’s norms and governments across the 
Persian Gulf waterway, and independent of the strategic US policies. If regional states reach to that extent 
of intellectual maturity so that they could constructively interact in economic cooperation and through 
confidence building measures, then region goes towards convergence and establishment of a joint security 
system in order to reduce the existing tensions and make optimum use of the Western 
intellectual/technological potentials. Taeb & khalili believe that a scenario as such is the wisest strategy in 
the present circumstances simply because a joint security solution also has a steady tendency towards 
regional order and security plus fulfillment of security in different spheres and angles as its ultimate 
goal.(Saeed Taeb & KHalili, 2008) 
Marcy Agmon in a rand report “Post cold war U.S security strategies for the Persian Gulf” presents four 
representative security alternatives for the Persian Gulf. 1) Saudi defense independence 2) U.S-Saudi 
security condominium 3) all Arab defense of the Persian gulf 4) US as disengaged balancer. (Agmon, 1993) 
but none of these four security alternatives invite the participation in a security pact of all members of the 
Persian Gulf region including Iran and Iraq but it has been asserted that the exclusion of specific regional 
states from Persian Gulf security arrangements would polarize the region; exacerbate tensions; and make 
resolution of existing disputes more difficult.  
In an informal announcement of Iran’s decision to ensure a successful regional security system for the 
Persian Gulf; Saideh Lotfian believes Iran, Iraq and Yemen must be part of any security arrangement in the 
Persian Gulf.(Lotfian, 2007-08) she believes the main pillar of Iranian policy on the Persian Gulf is based, 
on the regional states’ responsibility for ensuring security of this region without the outside help. One 
barrier in the way of improving the security environment of the region is the current tension between Iran 
and the United States. This has also overshadowed Iran’s ties with other regional states. In sum Iranian 
think about an effective regional security pact to minimize extra-regional Influence of foreign countries.  
Lotfian (2008) express that another strategy of Iranian foreign policy are:  
- Encouraging regional economic and political integration: 
 Interestingly, Iran and the UAE despite the latter's territorial claims over the three Iranian islands, still 
have strong and deep-seated economic and trade ties. The Iranian investors have invested heavily in Dubai, 
so much so that they became its fourth major trading partner in 2004. 
- Demilitarization and Call for a WMD Free Zone in the Persian Gulf. 
- Effective Regional Security Pact to Minimize Extra-Regional Influence: 
Iran has a special geo-strategic position and can become a bridge between the energy-rich regions of the 
Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea regions. 
Kayhan Barzegar an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Islamic Azad University in Tehran 
in an article under title: “Iran, New Iraq and the Persian Gulf Political-Security Architecture”, believes to 
the necessity of establishing a new political-security arrangement in the Persian Gulf region in the light of 
new political developments in the region after the 2003 Iraq crisis.(BARZEGAR, 2008) 
Barzegar believes that a new regional security system in the Persian Gulf must be based on political, 
cultural and security realities of the region. This system is based on three factors of: 
1. Increase in Iran’s importance and its augmented regional role; 
2. Emergence of a new Iraq with a different nature; 
3. Changes in the nature of security challenges. 
Barzegar (2008) express that the traditional security system in the region has been designed chiefly upon 
the traditional threats and particularly based on the situations of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Policies such 
as balance of power”, “dual containment and descriptions such as presenting Iran’s “imaginary threat” to 
the region for imposing “imported security system” based only on the demands and interests of 
trans-regional players or in other words, “third party interests” have been the main components of such a 
security system. With the new developments, such an arrangement that multiplies the causes for tension and 
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mistrust among the regional states and is based on mutual misperception about the roles, positions and aims 
of the others regional countries is not in conformity with regional realities, and just as demonstrated during 
the crises in the last few years namely the first and second Persian Gulf wars, it lacks the required efficacy. 
For the same reason, the current conditions and realities of the region inevitably demand new regional 
security arrangement. 
Writer at the end of his article present four approaches for the new security arrangement in the Persian 
Gulf region requires contemplating the followings: 
1) Engagement of All Actors:  
Approaching to a kind of “parity”, "convergence of common wills” and attainment of a balance based on 
the role of all involved players and commensurate with their sources of power is of vital importance.  
2) Redefining the Role of Trans-Regional Actors: 
Just as the Iraq crisis demonstrated, regional nations are not prepared like the past, to accept the dominant 
role and influence of foreign powers namely the US in their affairs. 
3) Identifying Common Indigenous Security Threats: 
A new redefinition of the main regional players' perception of new security threats is worthwhile to this 
end. 
4) Building Regional Interdependence: 
All players will attempt to prevent tension that can have security, political, economic or cultural 
roots.(BARZEGAR, 2008) 
 
6.1  Collective security as an ideal approach  
An approach that can be compatible for peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and many scholars, 
especially Iranian scholars, used it as the final approach and believe can bring peace and security for this 
aria is Collective Security and it is supposed that Collective Security approach is an ideal security system 
for the Persian Gulf region. In this part we review some famous ideas about collective security and in 
conclusion we will conclude about this approach. 
The concept of collective security may be defined as general cooperative action for the maintenance and 
enforcement of international peace. The concept of collective security: First, it assumes that each state is 
interested, to varying degrees, in the occurrence of interstate conflict and in methods employed in the 
settlement of international disputes. Secondly, the notion of a ’general cooperative action’ means that a 
collective security system is incompatible with the doctrine of self-help as a basis for international 
organizations. Thirdly, in order to preserve or reestablish peace, collective action, whenever necessary, can 
be undertaken. Fourthly, ’general cooperative action’ also implies that the vast majority of states in the 
collective security system must unite against the aggressor country. (Tarzi, 1997) 
There are three fundamental tenets for collective security system. First, it is a system of cooperation 
among states such that an act of aggression by one of its members is an act of aggression against all of its 
members. As defined in the 1930s, the meaning is “the safety of all by all.” Secondly, enforcement must 
have a degree of automaticity among the members of the collective security system. Members of the system 
must “be willing and able at all times to muster overwhelming strength for collective defense at successive 
points of conflict. A third element is some level of commitment to the status quo that is to say, the members 
of the system are states, and the vast majority (at least) of such states regard as sufficiently equitable their 
boundaries and other relationships (for example, trade), so that preponderant force can be mobilized to 
deter, or reverse, an act of aggression. (Clark, 1995a) 
The fundamental structural principle of a Collective Security System can be illustrated with the 
axiom ’one for all and all for one’. As a legal expression, this characterizes ’Collective Security’ as a 
system in which (1) nations commit themselves to the mutual and automatic securing of peace, (2) the 
protective function is independent of whether the aggressor is a member or not, and (3) the security system 
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is never directed at a specific potential aggressor or aggressors. Common Security does not have ’only’ the 
long-term aim of replacing pacts and blocs as well as establishing a system of Collective Security. (Lutz, 
1984) 
The model of collective security assumes that each member of international society be prepared to see an 
aggression anywhere as a threat to the peace and to view an attack on one as an attack on all. Peace, in other 
words, must be seen as indivisible. In addition, the model assumes that states are prepared to act decisively 
on this recognition even if such action is costly and goes against their more immediate short-term interests. 
Whether or not a state responded to a particular act of aggression would be determined by the overall 
pattern of its foreign policy interests.(Hurrell, 1992) 
Robert D. Murphy believes that collective security needs some implications as follow: First, Working 
partnerships, second; Long-term basis: collective security policies are not designed to meet an emergency 
situation. Third, Costs: we must accept the fact that our collective-security policies cost a great deal of 
money and probably will continue to be costly for a long period of years. Fourth, Requirements of 
leadership: The requirements of leadership are complex and strenuous, and the essential requirement is a 
profound understanding of the obligations of partnership. Fifth, not to destroy: the path of collective 
security involves many difficulties. (Murphy) 
Many scholars have criticism to collective security approach. Clark describes the principal criticisms of 
collective security as: 1) The very rebirth of enthusiasm for collective security leads to the suspicion that the 
conditions that make it now seem possible (peace-absence of a threat) will lead to its demise when 
inevitably the conditions change. 2) The universality and automatic of the commitments of collective 
security will not be matched by members’ actions. 3) The timing of the response: Collective Security is 
likely to delay reaction to attack, because the members of the system must react, mobilize, and 
coordinate their response ad hoc. 4) The emphasis on multilateralism in the theory of collective security 
denigrates the value of unilateralism. 5) Because collective security envisions an automatic, multilateral 
response, such a response may actually turn minor wars into major ones. (Clark, 1995a) 
Although the idea of collective security has had a curious history and we have been unable either to 
accept it or to acknowledge our abandonment of it. We reject and repudiate it in practice but persist in 
coddling it in theory. The advocacy for collective security remains strong and despite the problems with the 
theory of collective security, and, more specifically, the problems with the practice of peacekeeping, the 
U.S continues to favor multilateral approaches to the problem of security. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
The US dependency on oil imports and strategic position of the Persian Gulf has been always two golden 
principles for the US vital interests in this region. After withdrawal of UK from Persian Gulf in 1971, 
American interred to the region indirectly by Twin pillars policy or Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine. According 
to this policy Iran and Saudi Arabia were selected as military and economic pillars and so Iran during this 
period (1971-1979) was gendarme of the region. 
After Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and over thorn of Pahlavi’s Regime, collapsed the twin pillars 
policy and American interests in the Persian Gulf region was confronted with many challenges from the 
new revolutionary regime. To this end, The American policy makers have devised numerous strategies and 
plans for this important region that could help them find better opportunities in the Persian Gulf region. 
Carter Doctrine (Deployment Joint Task Forces that Later renamed the U.S. Central Command 
[USCENTCOM]), Clinton Doctrine (Dual containment policy), and direct presence at G.W. Bush 
administration were some of policies that US policy makers made it.  But when we review and analyze the 
consequences of such policies for the US and other regional and international players, it seems that these 
policies were not successful and three main wars in less than two decade show the reality of this fact.  
Islamic republic of Iran with a population of over 70 million, vast lands and extended sea borders in the 
Persian Gulf is among the largest countries not only in the Persian Gulf, but also in the Middle East, so any 
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imported regional security system for this important area that littoral states of the Persian Gulf –especially 
Iran- has not been participated in it cannot be successful.  
The Persian Gulf nations should build a system based on indigenous values and practices and looking for 
any experience as a model for the Persian Gulf, the same as Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) or the Association for the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), may not be useful, because 
each region has its specified characteristics and geostrategic position, although the latter organization 
[ASEAN] can be more compatible for this region. 
Iran and the other nations of the Persian Gulf have suffered greatly from military conflicts over the past 
three decades, including the ongoing conflicts in Iraq, the 1991 war in Kuwait, and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq 
war. So the current Persian Gulf security system, cannot offers the chance to stabilize the region. 
Meanwhile, the creation of a Persian Gulf-wide cooperative security forum that involve all regional states 
without presence of external powers including US, would increase  regional security by giving recognition 
to all legitimate security concerns and could play an increasingly important role as the forum matures. 
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